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INFORMATION & EQUILIBRIUM IN INSURANCE MARKETS
WITH BIG DATA
PETER SIEGELMAN1
***
Asymmetric information makes the behavior of insurance markets
very difficult to predict. But this Article argues that the increasing use of
Big Data by insurers will not result in forecasts of loss that are so accurate
that they eliminate uncertainty, and with it, the possibility of insurance.
Big Data techniques might lead to a “flip” in informational asymmetry,
resulting in a situation in which insurers know more about their customers
than the latter know about themselves. But the effects of such a
development could actually be benign. Finally, the Article considers the
potential for Big (or at least, More) Data to create new markets for
spreading risks that are currently uninsurable.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

Big Data is a hot topic these days, at least in the nerdosphere.2
Pundits proclaim it to be “revolutionary,”3 “transformative,”4 and “a tidal
wave.”5 Some have even suggested that the further use of Big Data will
overturn our outmoded reliance on primitive notions such as “causation”6

1

I thank Peter Kochenburger, Rick Swedloff, and the editors of the CILJ for
helpful comments, and Pat McCoy and Francois Ewald for initiating the
conversation.
2
VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK (2013)
(sitting at number 9,501 on Amazon.com’s sales rankings as of October 13, 2014:
not bad for a book with “data” in its title).
3
Id. at 7.
4
ERIC SCHMIDT & JARED COHEN, THE NEW DIGITAL AGE: TRANSFORMING
NATIONS, BUSINESSES, AND OUR LIVES (2014).
5
BILL FRANKS, TAMING THE BIG DATA TIDAL WAVE: FINDING
OPPORTUNITIES IN HUGE DATA STREAMS WITH ADVANCED ANALYTICS 5 (2012).
6
“Petabytes [lots of data] allow us to say: ‘Correlation is enough.’” Chris
Anderson, The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method
Obsolete, W IRED M AG . (June 23, 2008), http://archive.wired.com/science/
discoveries/magazine/16-07/pb_theory; see also Correlation, XKCD, http://xkcd.
com/552/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
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and “privacy.”7
This Article has a much narrower focus, however: I want to reflect
critically on the role of Big Data in insurance. In particular, I ask what
economic theory has to say about whether Big Data will lead to new
equilibria in insurance markets. I focus on three questions: Might Big Data
lead to the collapse of insurance altogether by permitting predictions of
such accuracy that risk and uncertainty are effectively eliminated? Even if
it doesn’t have such drastic effects, might it alter insurance market
equilibria, by reducing the scope for risk-spreading? And might it be used
to create new types of insurance that are not currently practical given
current informational constraints? At the risk of destroying the narrative
suspense, my proposed answers are, respectively: “no,” “probably not,” and
“possibly.”
So, what is Big Data, anyway? Big Data is not a precise term, and
several definitions are currently competing for supremacy. For our
purposes, it suffices to think of Big Data as (i) very large collections of
observations, particularly those that also include very large numbers of
variables;8 and (ii) associated statistical techniques for using these ultralarge datasets to make predictions or forecasts.
II.

PROLOGUE: INSURANCE MARKETS ARE WEIRD

A classic method of economic analysis is known as “Comparative
Statics:” assume a (small) change to some variable, and then compare
equilibria before and after this change has worked its way through the
model or system. Economists have come to realize, however, that this
method tends to break down in markets where there are significant
informational asymmetries, that is, where one party to a transaction knows
more than their counterpart does.9 Insurance markets are the locus classicus
7

Claire Porter, Little Privacy in the Age of Big Data, GUARDIAN (June 20,
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/20/little-privacy-in-theage-of-big-data (“In the era of big data, the battle for privacy has already been
fought and lost . . . .”).
8
According to Google chief economist Hal Varian, “Google has seen 30
trillion URLs, crawls over 20 billion of those a day, and answers 100 billion search
queries a month. Analyzing even one day’s worth of data of this size is virtually
impossible with conventional techniques.” Hal R. Varian, Big Data: New Tricks
for Econometrics, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4 (2014).
9
See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market For "Lemons”: Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970) (using the used
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of informational asymmetries, in the form of adverse selection and moral
hazard,10 and this in turn implies that our ordinary intuitions about how
markets work may fail decisively when it comes to insurance markets.
For example, we would predict that in ordinary markets, sellers
would view demand for their product as a good thing, and indeed would be
delighted to sell to anyone who wanted to buy from them: picture Lucy at
her lemonade stand when a customer arrives and says “I’ll buy all the
lemonade you have to sell at 25¢ a glass.” But insurance is different. How
will Irene react when someone rushes up to her insurance stand and says
“I’ll buy all the life insurance you’ll sell me at 25¢ per $125 of coverage?”
The explanation for the difference is, of course, the (fear of an)
informational asymmetry that Irene faces but Lucy does not. The life
insurance customer who desperately wants lots of coverage may well know
something about his own prospects for longevity that her potential insurer
does not know, and this information is obviously highly relevant to the
insurer’s profitability from transacting with this customer.11
It is by now well-known that informational asymmetries have a
profound effect on the institutions of insurance markets, from the language
of contracts to the scope and function of regulation. My point is that in the
presence of such asymmetries, insurance market equilibria are highly
sensitive to small and seemingly trivial details of how a market operates.
car market as an example to discuss the relationship between quality and
uncertainty and the problem that relationship poses for the theory of market
equilibrium); Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of
Medical Care, 53 AMER. ECON. REV. 941 (1963) (explaining that the special
economic problems of the medical care industry are adaptations to the existence of
uncertainty in the incidence of disease and the efficacy of treatment); Michael
Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An
Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. ECON. 629 (1976)
(analyzing competitive insurance markets in which the characteristics of the
insured are not fully known to the insurer).
10
Both concepts are central to virtually all aspects of modern economics; both
began as terms of art in insurance. Adverse selection can loosely be defined as the
tendency of the worst risks to find insurance price for an average risk to be
especially attractive. Moral hazard (again, loosely) occurs whenever the presence
of insurance causes insureds to take less care to prevent risks than they would
exercise in its absence.
11
See USLife Credit Life Ins. Co. v. McAfee, 630 P.2d 450 (Wash. Ct. App.
1981) (discussing how an insurance professional took out numerous credit life
insurance policies that required no medical underwriting, on his wife, who he knew
was suffering from terminal cancer).
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Under some circumstances, there may be no equilibrium possible at all;12
under slightly different circumstances, only “separating” equilibria (those
in which each risk-type pays a premium that fully reflects its riskiness, with
no cross-subsidization between types); under others, “pooling” (crosssubsidization from low-risk to high-risk insureds) is sustainable in
equilibrium.13 Moreover, insurance supply and demand are not actually
independent, as they are in ordinary markets.14 Thus, a mandate to buy
insurance, rather than simply increasing demand and causing prices to rise,
may actually lower costs and result in a fall in prices; it could even obviate
the requirement to purchase insurance in the first instance.15
The situation gets even more complicated and unpredictable if we
recognize that consumers are not perfectly rational, which the evidence
overwhelmingly demonstrates is the case.16 Consumers often buy
“insurance” products, such as extended warranties, that no rational person
should want;17 conversely, they frequently shun coverage for losses due to
floods or earthquakes that a rational person would want to insure against.18
12

Rothschild & Stiglitz, supra note 9, at 634–37.
Id.; see also Georges Dionne & Neil Doherty, Adverse Selection in
Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO INSURANCE
ECONOMICS 116 (Georges Dionne ed., 1992).
14
For a cogent explanation, see Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein, Selection in
Insurance Markets: Theory and Empirics in Pictures, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 115, 118
(2011). The basic idea is that unlike a purchaser of, say, broccoli, the purchaser of
insurance contributes to both sides of the market. A low-risk purchaser lowers the
aggregate risk of the pool of insureds as a whole, and thus reduces the cost of
supplying insurance to everyone. Demand and cost are not independent.
15
Raphael Boleslavsky & Sergio J. Campos, Does the Individual Mandate
Coerce?, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 4-8 (2012).
16
See generally HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER ET AL., INSURANCE AND
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: IMPROVING DECISIONS IN THE MOST MISUNDERSTOOD
INDUSTRY (2013) (discussing examples of “anomalous” behavior by consumers,
insurance companies, investors, and regulators).
17
For a detailed explanation and policy recommendations, see Tom Baker &
Peter Siegelman, “You Want Insurance With That?” Using Behavioral Economics
to Protect Consumers from Add-On Insurance Products, 20 CONN. INS. L. J. 1
(2013).
18
Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, Behavioral Economics and Insurance Law:
The Importance of Equilibrium Analysis, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Doron Teichman & Eyal Zamir eds., 2014); David M.
Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, Extending the Theory to Meet the Practice of
Insurance, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES (2004);
13
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And it turns out that correcting for some kinds of “mistakes” made by
insufficiently-rational consumers may actually exacerbate informational
asymmetries and reduce welfare for everyone.19
The moral of all this is simple: beware of anyone (including me)
who confidently tells you anything about how insurance markets behave,
including how they will react to the increased use by insurers of Big Data.
There is little basis in theory or empirical evidence for any confident
forecast about how Big Data will shape insurance markets. What follows,
then, is more by way of cautious speculation than robust prediction.
III.

COULD BIG DATA VANQUISH UNCERTAINTY (AND
DESTROY INSURANCE)?
A.

TMI AND THE ABSENCE OF INSURANCE

Economists have long understood that uncertainty is a prerequisite
for insurance. Table 1 provides a simple numerical example. A village
consists of 100 identical houses, each of which is worth $200,000, and
which constitutes each homeowner’s total wealth. There is a 25% chance
that any individual house will be completely destroyed by the next
earthquake. Each homeowner has the same utility function, Ui =
U(Wealth) = ln(Wealth), which implies that they are risk-averse.
Will the villagers demand insurance, assuming it can be purchased
at the actuarially-fair premium (without any load)? To see that the answer
is yes, we can compare each villager’s expected utility without insurance to
her utility with it. Without insurance, a homeowner’s expected utility is
Pr(Loss)H(Utility|Loss) + Pr(No Loss)H(Utility|No Loss) =
0.25Hln(Wealth|Loss) + 0.75Hln(Wealth|No Loss) =
0.25Hln(0) + 0.75Hln(200,000) = 8.58.20
KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 16, at 115.
19
See, e.g., Benjamin R. Handel, Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health
Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts, 103 AMER. ECON. REV. 2643 (2013);
Alvaro Sandroni & Francesco Squintani, Overconfidence, Insurance, and
Paternalism, 97 AMER. ECON. REV. 1994, 1994 (2007); Justin Sydnor,
(Over)insuring Modest Risks, 2 AMER. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 177, 198 (2010).
20
Since ln(0) is undefined, we innocuously substitute 0.001 for (Wealth|Loss).
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100 times this amount is the village’s aggregate utility when nobody
buys insurance.
Suppose we now introduce the possibility of insurance, sold with
no load. The actuarially fair premium is equal to the expected loss, which
is just 0.25H200,000 = $50,000. Thus, anyone who buys insurance pays a
premium of $50,000 and has guaranteed wealth of (200,000 - 50,000 = )
$150,000.21 The utility of $150,000 held with certainty is just ln(150,000) =
11.92. Since this is larger than the expected utility of doing without
insurance, everyone will want to purchase full coverage, and village
aggregate utility is thus 1,192, which is higher than before.

21

If the earthquake does not occur, the premium is paid but there are no
losses, so wealth is 200,000 - 50,000 = $150,000. If the earthquake does occur, the
homeowner pays a premium of 50,000, loses 200,000, and then receives a check
for the full amount of the loss, again leaving her with $150,000 net.

2014

INFORMATION & EQUILIBRIUM
Table 1: Insurance vs Non-Insurance,
No Individuation (homogenous risk)
Assumptions
Population Size

100

Individual Wealth, W

200,000

Size of Lossi

200,000

Probability of Loss*

25%

Utility function, U(W)

ln(W)

No Insurance
Aggregate Expected Loss

5,000,000

Aggregate Expected Utility

858

With Insurance (Pooling)
Fair Premium

50,000

Wealth, After Premium

150,000

Utility

11.92

Aggregate Utility

1,192

i

Need reference here
For every individual.

*

323

324

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 21.1

Now imagine that we have access to some technology that generates
perfect predictions: instead of each villager facing a 25% chance of having
his or her home destroyed, we know with certainty which 25 homes will be
destroyed and which 75 will escape any damage. The owners of the 75
known-to-be-safe houses will obviously have no demand for insurance at
any positive premium, since they would be paying for coverage that would
be of no use to them. Conversely, owners of the 25 known-to-be-destroyed
houses will certainly want insurance. But the only coverage available to
them will be at the fair premium for a certain-to-be-destroyed house
(100%H200,000 =) $200,000, and there is no reason to buy coverage when
the premium is equal to the actual loss.22 So once the forecasting
technology is made available, nobody will purchase insurance.
The loss of risk-spreading that accompanies perfect forecasting leaves
the community as a whole worse off.23 Aggregate welfare is now the same
as in the no-insurance state described earlier (858), which is 28% lower
than when insurance is possible. Before the technology is introduced,
behind Rawls’ veil of ignorance, the community would want to ban its use.
Too much information can reduce welfare.24
22

Note that it is irrelevant whether the insurance company has direct access to
this technology or not. Suppose homeowners are the only ones who know whether
or not their house will be destroyed; by the logic above, those who want to buy
insurance are only the owners who know they will lose their house for sure. The
insurance company can thus infer that anyone who demands insurance will be a
guaranteed house-loser, and will price its product accordingly. Cf. Alexander
Tabarrok, Genetic Testing: An Economic and Contractarian Analysis, 13 J.
HEALTH ECON. 75, 75–76, 79–82 (1994) (providing an example of this concept in
the genetic testing context).
23
In fact, it in some sense destroys the meaning of “community.” Before the
forecast, everyone in the village was subject to the same risk, and all had a
common interest in minimizing its effects via mutual insurance. After the forecast,
however, those who will be spared are no longer interested in sharing their fortune
with that of their known-to-be-less-fortunate neighbors.
24
For an elegant discussion of the divergence between the private and social
value of information, see Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of
Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AMER. ECON. REV. 561
(1971). Hirshleifer’s point is that in a pure exchange economy, “the community as
a whole obtains no benefit . . . from either the acquisition or dissemination of
private foreknowledge.” Id. at 565 (emphasis in original). Foreknowledge is
defined as the accurate prediction of an event that will eventually come to pass (or
not), as distinguished from the discovery of something new that need not be
discovered at all. See, e.g., id. at 562. In my example, information prevents risk-
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HOW GOOD CAN BIG DATA BE?

Speaking very broadly, Big Data can generate better predictions by
uncovering new independent variables, or combinations of variables, that
help explain the outcome of interest, and it can help uncover new ways in
which the independent variables are related to the outcome.25 But for most
risks for which people seek insurance, it seems virtually impossible that
any feasible improvement in the technology of prediction could so
significantly increase accuracy as to make insurance impossible.
Assertions of seemingly miraculous predictions emerging from Big
Data are often, on closer examination, grossly exaggerated. Two years ago,
for example, New York Times reporter Charles Duhigg wrote a widelydiscussed article about how Target was able to use Big Data techniques to
predict, on the basis of their purchasing patterns, which customers were
pregnant.26 The story featured an account of an angry father whose teenage
daughter received ads for diapers and wipes, even though (he believed) she
was not pregnant. But it turned out that she actually was, and Target had
apparently used Big Data to figure this out before he did.
Writing in the Financial Times, economist Tim Harford effectively
debunks this story, however. It turns out that the reported success of
Target’s algorithm ignored the false positive problem: we didn’t get to hear
the stories about women who received coupons for babywear but who were
not pregnant.
Hearing the anecdote, it’s easy to assume that Target’s
algorithms are infallible–that everybody receiving coupons
for onesies and wet wipes is pregnant. This is vanishingly
unlikely. Indeed, it could be that pregnant women receive
such offers merely because everybody on Target’s mailing
list receives such offers. We should not buy the idea that
spreading, and hence is actually destructive of social welfare.
25
For a brief and appropriately skeptical view of the strengths and weaknesses
of Big Data, see Sendhil Mullainathan, Why Computers Won’t be Replacing You
Just Yet: A 25-Question Twitter Quiz to Predict Retweets, N.Y. TIMES (July 1,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/03/upshot/a-25-question-twitter-quiz-topredict-retweets.html.
26
Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html.
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Target employs mind-readers before considering how
many misses attend each hit.27
C.

IS THE TMI PROBLEM A REALISTIC CONSEQUENCE OF BIG
DATA?

It is possible that Big Data may produce too much information,
leading to the selective destruction of insurance markets. But is this
theoretical possibility one we should be worried about? Although there
may be some exceptions, I think the answer for most risks we care about is
“no.”28
For an example of how difficult prediction can be, consider
forecasting someone’s future earnings at the time they graduate from high
school. Economists Alan Kreuger and William Bowen attempted this
exercise, considering “an embarrassingly long list of [108] explanatory
variables . . . including sets of variables measuring family income, parents’
education, parents’ occupation, students’ expected occupation [on
graduating from high school], race, sex, religion, age, and achievement test
scores.”29 “Perhaps surprisingly,” the authors conclude, “an ordinary least
squares regression with these variables accounted for only one-quarter of
the variability in earnings.”30 Big Data techniques could be used to reduce
the list of 108 variables to a smaller number that were the most powerful
explanatory factors. They could be used to find additional variables that
might enable some further gains in predictive accuracy. But they cannot
dramatically improve the prediction of events or outcomes with millions of
independent causes, each of which contributes only a tiny share of the
overall effect.
Suppose instead that we are trying to explain whether individual i’s
house burns down over some fixed period. We might start with traditional
underwriting information: the date the house was built, the kind of
materials used, the owner’s smoking status, and so on. Now consider
27

Harford attributes this insight to statistician Kaiser Fung. Tim Harford, Big
Data: Are We Making a Big Mistake?, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2014),
http://on.ft.com/P0PVBF.
28
Kenneth S. Abraham & Pierre-André Chiappori, Classification Risk and Its
Regulation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
INSURANCE (Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman eds., forthcoming 2015).
29
Alan B. Krueger & William G. Bowen, Policy Watch: Income-Contingent
College Loans, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 196 (1993).
30
Id.
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expanding the set of possible explanatory variables, augmenting traditional
underwriting data with new information of the kind Big Data techniques
are designed to discover and utilize, such as the homeowner’s high school
GPA; the list of magazines she subscribes to; and the number of calls made
from the home to area code 510.
It is possible that one or more of these new variables, separately or
interacted with each other or existing variables, could improve predictive
accuracy. For example, when it comes to predicting the chance of a fire
this year, knowing that the homeowner had GPA of 2.3 or that she
subscribes to Soldier of Fortune might be more useful than knowing that
her home was built in 1956.
Big Data methods allow the researcher to consider many more
variables and combinations of variables than has traditionally been
possible, including “high dimensional” cases where the number of
explanatory variables is greater than the number of observations.31 When
analysts are searching for a parsimonious group of a few explanatory
variables from among many possibilities, Big Data and machine learning
techniques can be extremely useful. But that is not the same as saying that
Big Data can explain the otherwise inexplicable.
There is no doubt that there may be gains to be achieved from
using Big Data techniques to predict fire risk. But as Table 2 makes clear,
it is almost algebraically impossible that any newly discovered variable
(e.g., homeowner’s GPA) or combination of variables (Female &
Subscribes to Soldier of Fortune magazine & GPA less than 2.5) could
enable highly-accurate predictions of fire risk. Imagine that, by using Big
31

For an introduction to the theory and some examples, see Alexandre Belloni
et al., High-Dimensional Methods and Inference on Structural and Treatment
Effects, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 33-34, 38-41 (2014). Moreover, these techniques
are designed to prevent “over-fitting” or ad hoc specifications in which the
researcher develops an explanatory model that fits the data for a given sample, but
is useless for predictive purposes outside of the sample. Overfitting of this kind is
more likely as the ratio of explanatory variables to observations increases. In the
limit, there are exactly as many variables (plus a constant) as there are
observations. In this case, the ordinary least squares estimator will fit the data
perfectly, returning an R2 of one. However, using the estimated model is likely to
result in very poor forecasting properties out-of-sample because the model
estimated by least squares is overfit: the least-squares fit captures not only the
signal about how predictor variables may be used to forecast the outcome, but also
fits the noise that is present in the given sample, and is not useful for forming outof-sample predictions. Id. at 30.
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Data, we found that being female, subscribing to Soldier of Fortune, and
having a high school GPA of less than 2.5 are collectively associated with a
100-fold increase in fire risk. If Big Data techniques could generate a
robust improvement in prediction of this magnitude, it would be truly
shocking.32 But even if such an improvement were achievable, it would
only raise the probability of a fire (for the small number of persons in this
group) from 9/10,000 to 900/10,000, which is still less than 10 percent. A
dramatic increase from the baseline case, to be sure, but nothing remotely
approaching a risk so high as to be virtually certain, one that would shred
the veil of ignorance needed to make risk-spreading possible.
Table 2: Back-of-the-Envelope U.S. Fire Risk
236,200
annual average one- and two-family residential fires in the
period 2009-2011.33
90,742,000 single unit homes.34
0.0026
annual probability that a house will experience a fire
(26/10,000)
But what about rare medical conditions, such as Huntington’s
disease, you might ask? Estimates apparently vary quite widely, but one
recent study estimated the annual incidence of Huntington’s disease to be
0.38 per 100,000, which is only 1/685th as high as the US annual housefire risk.35 Yet some scholars have suggested that Huntington’s is
32

By “robust,” I mean that the correlation would hold up in the future, and
would reflect not just a random association in the sample of cases on which the
predictive model was estimated. In Mullainathan’s example, a Big Data algorithm
predicted “which [of a given pair of] tweet[s] gets retweeted [more often] about 67
percent of the time, beating humans, who on average get it right only 61 percent of
the time.” Mullainathan, supra note 25. Impressive as this is, it represents only a
10% improvement (6%/61%) over human performance.
33
Nat’l Fire Data Center, U.S. Fire Admin., One- and Two-family Residential
Building Fires (2009-2011), 14 TOPICAL FIRE REP. SERIES 1, 1 (Sept. 2013),
available at http://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/statistics/v14i10.pdf.
34
Table C-01-AH: General Housing Data—All Housing Units, H150/11 AM.
HOUSING SURV. FOR U.S.: 2011 at 3 (2013), available at
http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/programssurveys/ahs/data/2011/h150-11.pdf.
35
“Meta-analysis of data from four incidence studies revealed an incidence of
0.38 per 100,000 per year,” while a meta-analysis of eleven studies suggested that
“[t]he [lifetime] service-based prevalence of HD . . . in Europe, North American
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essentially uninsurable36 because it is almost perfectly predictable based on
genetic screening: the disease occurs because of a trinucleotide repeat, and
anyone with more than 40 repeats is certain to be affected.37
For insurance purposes, the relevant difference between
Huntington’s risk and house fire risk is not their relative magnitudes.
Rather, it is that Huntington’s has a single, identifiable predictor, the
genetic defect is the only source of the condition, and everyone with the
defect develops the disease. House fires, by contrast, are not mechanically
linked to any single predictable-in-advance cause. Many women have low
high school GPAs and read Soldier of Fortune, but even in our hypothetical
world, only a small fraction of them will experience a house fire. The
social world is inherently more complex than the bio-physical world in this
respect. And even many medical conditions are more like type-2 diabetes
than like Huntington’s disease: they are the result of a complicated and
poorly-understood mix of environmental and biological factors, and there is
simply no clear-cut causal structure that explains when the risk will
materialize and when it won’t.38
[sic], and Australia, . . . [was] 5.70 per 100,000.” Tamara Pringsheim et al., The
Incidence and Prevalence of Huntington's Disease: A Systematic Review and
Meta-Analysis, 27 MOVEMENT DISORDERS 1083, 1083 (2012).
36
Pierre-André Chiappori, The Welfare Effects of Predictive Medicine, in
COMPETITIVE FAILURES IN INSURANCE MARKETS: THEORY AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS 55, 56, 65–66 (Pierre-André Chiappori & Christian Gollier eds.,
2006).
37
The defect involves the repetition of a group of three nucleotides (CAG:
Cytosine, Adenine and Guanine). Healthy people have between 7 and 35
repetitions of this group. However, an incidence of more than 40 repetitions leads
to the presence of the disease. Francis O. Walker, Huntington’s Disease, 369
LANCET 218, 220 (2007). The condition is autosomal dominant, which means that
a defective gene inherited from either parent is sufficient to cause the disease. Id.
38
Consider diabetes (which is actually several different conditions). “Most
patients with type 2 diabetes [which “accounts for 80% to 90% of cases of diabetes
in the United States”] . . . have some degree of tissue insensitivity to insulin
attributable to several interrelated factors . . . . These include putative (mostly as
yet undefined) genetic factors, which are aggravated in time by further enhancers
of insulin resistance such as aging, a sedentary lifestyle, and abdominal visceral
obesity. Not all patients with obesity and insulin resistance develop hyperglycemia,
however.” Umesh Masharani & Michael S. German, Chapter 17: Pancreatic
Hormones and Diabetes Mellitus, in GREENSPAN’S BASIC & CLINICAL
ENDOCRINOLOGY (David G. Gardner & Dolores Shoback eds., 9th ed. 2011),
available at http://accessmedicine.mhmedical.com/book.aspx?bookid=380.
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The bottom line is that Big Data techniques are not all that useful
for single-predictor risks such as Huntington’s disease, the cause of which
was discovered using ordinary scientific methods. And however useful
they are for more complex predictive structures, Big Data techniques do
not permit accurate prediction of multiply-caused rare events. While even
small improvements in predictive accuracy can be quite valuable,39 it seems
highly unlikely that Big Data techniques will produce dramatic
improvements in prediction. Mathematician Jordan Ellenberg recently put
it this way:
There are lots of . . . problems where supplying more data
improves the accuracy of the result in a fairly predictable
way. If you want to predict the course of an asteroid, you
need to measure its velocity and its position . . . The more
measurements you can make of the asteroid and the more
precise those measurements are, the better you’re going to
do at pinning down its track. But some problems are more
like predicting the weather[,] [because weather is, in the
technical sense of the word, chaotic.] . . . [H]uman
behavior [is] even harder to predict than the weather. We
have a very good mathematical model for weather, . . .
[but] [f]or human action we have no such model and may
never have one.40
IV.

WHAT IF INSURERS KNOW MORE THAN INSUREDS DO
ABOUT INDIVIDUAL RISK?

Even if Big Data methods are not sufficient to generate perfect (or
even very good) predictions, they could well have other effects that would
be worth taking seriously. Since policyholders themselves are not very
good at predicting their own riskiness in many situations, Big Data
techniques might offer insurers an improvement on the status quo that
39

Netflix offered a $1M prize to anyone who could improve its movierecommending algorithm by more than 10 percent. According to a Netflix official,
a 10% improvement in their recommendations, small as that seems, would recoup
the million in less time than it takes to make another Fast and Furious movie.
JORDAN ELLENBERG, HOW NOT TO BE WRONG: THE POWER OF MATHEMATICAL
THINKING 166 (2014).
40
Id. at 164-65.
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allows them to out-predict their customers. As we saw earlier, the
economic theory of insurance suggests that market equilibria are highly
sensitive to small changes in underlying assumptions or parameters, so
things might look very different if insurers were able to use Big Data
techniques to discover more about policyholders’ riskiness than the
policyholders themselves knew. Thus, whether or not these methods yield
good predictions in some absolute sense, they could still profoundly shape
equilibria, even if all they do is improve insurers’ predictions relative to
what insureds know.41
What follows is an attempt to illustrate this relatively simple
observation.
A.

CHARACTERIZING INFORMATION: WHO KNOWS WHAT

Consider a very simple description of possible information stocks.
Policyholders face a known loss, L, which is the same for everyone. Each
policyholder j has a unique probability of experiencing this loss, pj. The
actuarially fair premium for policyholder j is equal to j’s expected loss:
E(L) = pjHL.
In turn, the probability of loss depends on facts about the policyholder,
which we can describe as a vector of characteristics, Xj. We can thus write
pj = f(Xj),
which says nothing more than that the probability that individual j will
experience a loss is a function of the value of the various explanatory
variables for that individual, Xj.
We can go further and partition the variables that make up Xj into
two possibly-overlapping parts. Xj,P represents all the information the
policyholder knows about himself—for example, how recklessly he drives.
Xj,I represents the insurer's information about j (for example, the riskiness
of j's car, or of the area where he typically drives). Some information will,
of course, be uniquely held by one party, while some will be common to
both (j's sex or age). In addition, we should allow for information that is
known to nobody, which we can denote as random error, ε. Thus, the
expected loss (and fair premium) for policyholder j can be written as:
E(L) = f(Xj,P, Xj,I, ε)L.
41

Two hikers spot a bear getting ready to charge them. The first hiker drops
his pack, takes off his hiking boots, and begins to put on running shoes. The
second hiker asks, "What’s the point? You're never going to outrun that bear." The
first replies: "You're right, I won't; but all I need is to outrun you."
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Figure 1
Figure 1 presents some possible configurations of information sets.
For example, in panel 1, the insurer knows everything the policyholder
knows, as well as some information in addition. In panel 2, the situation is
reversed; the policyholder knows everything the insurer knows, and more.
It has generally been assumed by economists that (2) is the best
description of how the world works. For example, all models of adverse
selection and moral hazard are based on this characterization. While it may
seem implausible, there is actually a sophisticated justification for this
assumption. When the insurer quotes a price for insurance coverage for
individual j, j's premium, it will presumably make an optimal computation
of j's riskiness, based on all the information it has at its disposal. So the
insurer's estimated fair premium for j will be f(XjI)HL. But that's just the
expected loss for policyholder j, given the information available to the
insurer, XjI. And since the premium is actuarially fair,42 policyholder j can
easily deduce what the insurer thinks his risk of loss must be. For example,
42

This is required in a competitive equilibrium. A premium that is less than
actuarially fair can be expected to earn losses, and the insurer will prefer not to
offer any policy at all than to offer one that loses money. A premium priced above
the actuarially fair level will attract competitors who can offer a slightly lower
price and lure away all customers. So the only sustainable price in a competitive
market is the fair premium.
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suppose the loss is known to be 100. Then a quoted premium of 2 implies
that the insurer must believe there is a 2% chance it will have to pay out
100. That, in turn, suggests that even if the policyholder does not know
exactly what the insurer knows, he can infer all he needs to know about the
insurer's information via the premium he is quoted, which will necessarily
reveal exactly what the insurer believes about the policyholder's expected
loss. So the insurer effectively ends up having to surrender all its private
information in a competitive equilibrium, while the policyholder doesn’t.43
That situation resembles panel (2) of Figure 1.
But this simple story, appealing as it is, need not be correct. It is
possible to have equilibria in which the insurer knows less about insureds
than they know about themselves, even with completely rational
consumers, a competitive market, zero-cost (no load factor) insurance, and
no uncertainty about the size of the loss.44 The next section explains, by
way of an example.
B.

EQUILIBRIUM WHEN POLICYHOLDERS ARE BETTER INFORMED
THAN INSURERS45

Suppose that the population consists of equal numbers of two types
of insureds, high-risk and low-risk. The first group has a risk of loss equal
to 0.4 (pH = 40%); the second has a risk of loss equal to 0.3 (pL = 30%).
The loss is known to be 100 for all individuals who experience a loss. The
fair premium for the group as a whole is just the average loss:
43

The policyholder reveals some information when he decides to accept or
reject the insurer's offer, but it should be clear that this decision does not give away
everything the policyholder knows about his own riskiness.
44
If consumers are unable to make rational inferences—and the evidence cited
suggests this is indeed the case—their ability to extract the insurer's estimate of
their own riskiness from the premium quotation they receive is obviously
diminished. The ability to extract this information is further diminished by any
markup over the fair premium to cover the insurer's cost and by failures of
competition to drive prices down to the zero-profit level. KUNREUTHER ET AL.,
supra note 16.
45
Bertrand Villeneuve, Competition Between Insurers with Superior
Information, 49 EUR. ECON. REV. 321 (2005), provides the careful analysis on
which this loose paraphrase is based. There are important background conditions
(e.g., that all policyholders are risk averse enough so that they will demand
insurance at each of the possible premiums) which are too technical to consider
here.
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× 100 = 35.

Assume further that for any individual j, the insurer knows exactly
which group j is in, while j knows only the average risk of the population
as a whole, but not his own individual risk. The industry contains N
competitive firms, so that premiums are driven down to the actuarially fair
level (given that there are no operating or other costs). Thus, all firms earn
zero profit.
Suppose the insurer makes an offer to sell insurance to individual j
by quoting her a premium.46 Consider first the possibility that the insurer
quotes the group-wide average premium of 35. How would a policyholder
react to this offer? If she knew she were a low-risk individual, she should
reject the offer, because in a competitive market, she would be able to
attract a better one from another insurer until the premium was actuarially
fair for a known low-risk individual. (Conversely, a known high-risk
individual would be delighted to be quoted a premium that was less than
his actuarially fair value.) But the whole point is that the policyholder does
not know her own risk type, so the premium of 35 is the best she can
expect, given her ignorance of her own riskiness. Thus, both high and lowrisk individuals would be content to stick with the average or “pooled”
premium, if they were offered it.
But for this to be an equilibrium, we have to establish that the insurer
would want to quote the average price in the first place. Consider first what
happens when the insurer knows that j is low-risk (but remember, j herself
does not). A premium of 35 implies that the insurer would earn profits of 3530 = 5 for this customer, if she accepts the offer. But if the insurer offers a
premium appropriate for the population average risk of 35, it will then be
competing with every one of the other N insurers in the market who also offer
this price. That in turn means that the insurer faces a 1/N chance of landing
this consumer, for an expected profit of 5/N. Alternatively, the insurer might
consider quoting a slightly lower premium, say 34, and having a 100% chance
of attracting this policyholder given that all its competitors are quoting a price
of 35. That would yield a profit of 100%×(34-30) = 4. As long as the number
46

Significantly, this is what is known as a “signaling” equilibrium because the
informed party—here, the insurer—makes the offer. In standard models of
insurance market equilibrium, it is the uninformed party (still the insurer, but the
policyholder knows everything that the insurer does and more, so the insurer is
uninformed) who makes the offer, which leads to a “screening” equilibrium.

2014

INFORMATION & EQUILIBRIUM

335

of rivals is greater than 2, the insurer would prefer to offer the lower price and
land the customer with certainty.
Thus, it might look as if quoting the blended premium (35) cannot
be an equilibrium, because an insurer would prefer to do something else.
But that intuition turns out to be wrong. Once an uninformed customer
receives a quote of 34 from an insurer—who is known to be better
informed than she is—she will instantly know that the insurer knows she is
low-risk.47 With this knowledge, she is then in a position to demand a
reduction in premium to 30 (befitting a known low-risk customer); in a
competitive equilibrium with full information on all sides, the zero-profit
price is the only one that can prevail.
The point is that by quoting an even slightly more-appropriate
price, the insurer ends up telling the consumer exactly what her risk is, and
the consumer is then in a position to use that information against the
insurer, by insisting on an even lower premium. And in a competitive
market, she will, in fact, receive that lower premium. Thus, a small
deviation from the blended (average) premium will not be profitable for the
insurer. Sticking with the “pooled” rate will be the best the insurer can
hope to do.
C.

POOLING VS SEPARATION

The careful reader—if he or she has gotten this far—might find
something surprising here. A world in which insurers know more about
each policyholder than the policyholder does about herself is actually
supportive of a pooling equilibrium, one in which all consumers pay the
same “bundled” or average premium. The non-existence of a pooling
equilibrium in the presence of adverse selection is one of the key insights
of the pioneering Rothschild/Stiglitz model of insurance markets: when
consumers know more than insurers do, policyholders’ ability to select a
policy based on their “inside” information makes a pooling equilibrium
unsustainable in a competitive market.48
You might think that as insurers learn more and more about their
customers, premiums would become more and more individualized and the
possibility of pooling would only be diminished. But the weird economics
of insurance markets demonstrates that this need not be true. The example
above illustrates that when the insurer knows each customer’s risk exactly,
47
48

An offer of 34 is only profitable if made to a known low-risk consumer.
Rothschild & Stiglitz, supra note 9, at 639.
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while customers know only the group average risk, pooling equilibria are
possible. Unfortunately, theory predicts that separating equilibria (in which
each type pays a premium appropriate to its riskiness) are also possible.49
So, in the end, the lesson is cautionary. Theory does not support the idea
that as insurers learn more about their customers, pricing will necessarily
become more individualized and pooling and attendant risk-spreading will
necessarily decrease. Instead, a world in which insurers know more about
policyholders than the latter know about themselves might actually give
rise to more pooling.
V.

BIG DATA, BIG INSURANCE

In this section, I want to very briefly discuss 2013 Nobel Laureate
Robert Shiller’s50 visionary51 ideas for using Big (or at least More) Data to
dramatically increase risk-spreading by allowing consumers to insure
(pool) risks that they are currently forced to bear themselves. Shiller’s
insight is that new kinds of data, aggregated in new ways, could lead to
radically new forms of insurance against risks that consumers are currently
forced to bear themselves. (This is a somewhat different take on what “Big
Data” means, since we are no longer talking about data-mining techniques
to extract predictive information from high-dimensional data. Rather, as I
explain below, we are concerned with the prospect of creating new kinds of
information beyond that which is currently available.)
Consider, for example, the risk that one’s house might decline in
value (something few people did in fact consider in 2003, when Shiller’s
book was published), or the risk that one’s chosen line of work might
49

Villeneuve, supra note 45. The existence of separating equilibria depends on
the degree of consumers’ risk aversion and the difference in riskiness between the
two types. Note that despite its complexity, the model admits only an extremely
limited degree of consumer heterogeneity. Policyholders differ only in their
riskiness and not, for example, in their degree of risk aversion. Nor are consumers
subject to any behavioral “flaws” or deviations from rationality. For an attempt to
incorporate such heterogeneity into a theoretical (simulation) model of insurance
markets, see Tsvetanka Karagyozova & Peter Siegelman, Can Propitious Selection
Stabilize Insurance Markets?, 35 J. INS. ISSUES 121 (2012).
50
ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST
CENTURY (2003).
51
Some have almost gone so far as to suggest that “hallucinatory” would be a
better description. See Stephen A. Ross, Review of The New Financial Order by
Shiller. 42 J. ECON. LIT. 1098 (2004).
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experience a drop in demand, causing a fall in one’s earnings. Risk-averse
individuals should want these products, which protect against important
risks that they would prefer not to fact.
But individualized insurance against these risks cannot work,
Shiller points out, because of Moral Hazard.52 If the value of my home is
fully insured, I have an incentive to under-maintain it: maintenance is
costly, after all, and my home value insurance policy will cover any drop in
price when it comes time to sell the property.53 Similarly, if my livelihood
(earnings) is fully insured, I may slough off because hard work is costly
and my livelihood insurance will pick up any shortfall in my paycheck that
results from my shirking.54
Shiller’s brilliant insight is that even if some component of these
risks is uninsurable at an individual level, it is possible to create a viable
insurance product that covers aggregate-level risks without any moral
hazard risks. Thus, instead of insuring against a fall in the value of my
house, I would buy coverage against a drop in the value of all houses in my
city or neighborhood. Instead of insuring against a fall in my own earnings,
I would buy coverage against a drop in the earnings of all persons in my
profession (law professor) or perhaps some narrower aggregate (all law and
economics professors).
Under Shiller’s solution, some risks remains with the consumer, as
they must to preserve incentives, but at least medium- to large-scale risks can
be insured against. If the largest employer in town closes its factory and all
local house prices plummet, I am covered. If nobody wants to go to law school
any more, and law professor salaries plunge, I am covered there as well.
The genius of this approach is that it offers maximal insurance with no
potential for Moral Hazard, since insurance is offered only against drops in an
aggregate (price index), over which no individual exerts any control. If I
under-maintain my house, I bear 100% of the marginal loss in value, relative to
the average house in my neighborhood. If I slack off rather than working hard,
I do less well than the average law professor (even if all salaries drop), and
52

And possibly Adverse Selection as well, although Shiller scarcely mentions
adverse selection in his book.
53
Of course, if it were possible to write an insurance contract that covered
exactly what kind of maintenance I was required to do, this problem could be
solved. But, it seems clear that maintenance is simply too complicated,
heterogeneous and subjective to be captured by an ex ante contract.
54
See, e.g., Soviet-era Russia. There are possible selection issues as well if
homeowners know better than their insurers whether their house needs repairs or
what their own future work plans entail.
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those losses are not covered by my insurer. Shillerian insurance thus preserves
maximal incentives for me to work hard and to maintain my home, while
permitting me to pool risks that I would like to avoid.55
But in order for this kind of insurance to work, we need “Big” data
on aggregates (neighborhood home values, earnings by occupation or subspecialty). This information would need to be built up from detailed data
collected at an individual level. For each house, we have to know its age,
its square footage, its condition, and of course its price. This data could
then be aggregated to provide quality-weighted neighborhood-level
information that could then be used to set premiums and payouts. Shiller
and his collaborator Karl Case actually created such a dataset, which is now
maintained (for several cities) by the rating agency Standard and Poors.56
VI.

CONCLUSION

Equilibrium in insurance markets is highly sensitive to seeminglyinnocuous details about how offers are made and received, by whom, and
under what conditions. Robust predictions about how markets will respond to
any exogenous change are very difficult. It would therefore be silly to claim,
at least as a theoretical matter, that Big Data will have little or no effect on
insurance market equilibria. But at least the notion that Big Data techniques
will enable some sort of perfect prediction seems pretty far-fetched.
And while the collection and analysis of additional information
may pose some significant privacy concerns, it may also make possible the
creation of new markets for spreading risks that rational individuals should
greet with approval.

55

There is a structural similarity between this kind of insurance and Robert
Cooter’s theory of the law and economics of “precaution.” See Robert Cooter,
Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: the Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1
(1985). In both models, one party (the insurer or the injurer) bears responsibility
for the inframarginal precautions, while the other party (the insured or the tort
victim) bears responsibility for the marginal precautions, thereby providing
simultaneous incentives for both parties to take efficient levels of care.
56
See S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices, S&P DOW JONES,
http://us.spindices.com/index-family/real-estate/sp-case-shiller (last visited Aug.
11, 2014).

